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The Myth of the Jordanian Monarchy’s 
Resilience to the Arab Spring 
Lack of Genuine Political Reform Undermines Social Base of Monarchy 
Tamer Khorma 
The political reforms announced by the Jordanian regime in 2012 were widely wel-
comed on the international diplomatic level. However, these reforms reflect neither 
the priorities of political forces, nor those of the masses. Critical changes are dominat-
ing the socio-political scene: a new sense of national identity, popular outrage over 
corruption, a wide-spread loss of faith in the state as a result of poverty, unemploy-
ment, and the sell-off of productive state-owned companies, and the aggravation of 
conflicts within the regime. Against this background, new social movements have 
emerged and have been able to remobilize the masses. This has been reflected in 
demonstrations by public employees and independent trade unions that have led to 
confrontations with the authorities. Thus, without concrete constitutional reforms 
to transition toward constitutional monarchy as well as substantial socio-economic 
reform, stability in Jordan cannot be guaranteed for long. As a consequence, European 
countries should not only encourage the Jordanian regime to institute genuine eco-
nomic and political reform but also change their financial aid policies to support 
projects aimed at mitigating problems of unemployment and poverty. 
 
The protests in Jordan may have dwindled 
over the past three years, but the slogans 
chanted in 2012 reflect a radical change in 
the sense of national identity. While Jor-
danians used to consider the palace and the 
king the symbols of their national identity, 
the introduction of neoliberal economic 
policies under King Abdullah since 1999 
has not only led to conflicts within the 
regime but also affected how the palace is 
viewed by the people. 
One of the most critical slogans chanted 
during weekly demonstrations in all major 
Jordanian cities over the last three years 
was: “Our homeland Jordan preceded the 
Arab revolution.” By referring to the up-
rising against the Ottomans during World 
War I and Jordan’s existence as a homeland 
predating the monarchy, the slogan reflects 
a change that has taken place among Jor-
danians. Even people who never partici-
pated in the demonstrations compare King 
Abdullah’s policies with those of King 
Hussein (reigned 1951–1999), who is con-
sidered a symbol of Jordanian identity. 
Jordanians use this comparison to express 
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 their opposition to King Abdullah’s privati-
zations and other liberal economic policies. 
This topic dominates the few first minutes 
of any everyday discussion of political 
matters. 
People in Jordan used to consider their 
king a patriarchal figure. That changed 
even before the Arab Spring. Eastern Jor-
danians used to ask the royal court for 
financial support, which was given as a 
royal endowment. However, people now 
demand that the government provide 
public services like education, healthcare, 
and social security rather than charitable 
hand-outs. Military retirees are one group 
that has adopted these demands, which 
also include calls to reduce economic 
inequality. 
Conflicts within the Regime 
The interview with King Abdullah pub-
lished in April 2013 in The Atlantic hints at 
a growing conflict within the Jordanian 
regime between the neoliberals who domi-
nate the economy and are now represented 
by the palace, and the bureaucrats, whom 
the king described as “dinosaurs.” The 
bureaucrats consider themselves represent-
atives of Eastern Jordanian tribes, who 
used to constitute the social base of the 
monarchy. Bureaucrats also dominated the 
public sector and the military until 1999, 
when the liberal economic course began. 
Although the bureaucrats have since lost 
power vis-à-vis the neoliberals, they still 
enjoy considerable influence within the 
regime and over the Eastern Jordanians. 
Once the guardians of the monarchy, King 
Abdullah now calls them the main chal-
lenge to his neoliberal policy. 
This conflict within the regime reached a 
climax in May 2010, when military retirees 
published their first statement criticizing 
privatization, corruption, and the neolib-
erals’ domination of business. Their state-
ment reflected growing anxiety among the 
social base that used to support the palace. 
As a result of privatizations, Eastern Jor-
danians in particular have started to lose 
their sense of social security, given that the 
majority of them used to work in the public 
sector, while Palestinian Jordanians (whose 
families lived in Palestine before 1948) 
mostly work in the private sector.  
The anxiety was also driven by the policy 
of naturalization of Palestinians. The 
bureaucrats have argued since May 2010 
that some wealthy Palestinians, who 
acquired Jordanian citizenship during the 
past ten years as a result of contacts and 
mutual interest with decision makers and 
have since joined the neoliberal camp, had 
used new citizenship to obtain political 
positions they did not deserve. The bureau-
crats have also asserted that the naturaliza-
tion policy has forcefully imposed Jordani-
an citizenship on Palestinians. Abdelhadi 
al-Majali, former speaker of parliament and 
one of the most prominent representatives 
of the bureaucratic old guard, criticized the 
Jordanian constitution’s article on naturali-
zation of Palestinians: “Jordanian citizen-
ship was imposed on Palestinians, and this 
contradicts the right of the individual to 
choose his or her nationality.” Major-Gener-
al Mohammed al-Otom, spokesperson for 
the military retirees, defended this state-
ment in April 2013, citing negative effects 
on both Palestinians and Jordanians. 
These arguments became more pro-
nounced only after the bureaucrats started 
losing their political influence within the 
regime, leading to what has been referred 
to as a “war” within the regime between 
the old guardians and the neoliberals. This 
was reflected, for example, in the 2011 
struggle between the former president of 
the intelligence agency, General Moham-
med al-Dhahabi, and these new actors. The 
general provided the daily Al-Arab Al-Yawm 
and several journalists (whom he bribed) 
with information about liberal figures 
involved in corruption. One of these was 
Khaled Shahin, a businessman who had 
been convicted in a corruption scandal con-
cerning the expansion of an oil refinery. 
He was permitted to leave prison for medi-
cal treatment in the United States, but fled 
to Europe instead. Al-Dhahabi provided 
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 Al-Arab Al-Yawm with Shahin’s whereabouts 
and proof that he did not need medical 
treatment abroad. After publication of this 
information, demonstrations pressured the 
authorities to recapture Shahin. As a result 
of this and the publication of numerous 
other stories about corruption, the owner 
of Al-Arab Al-Yawm was forced to sell his 
newspaper under pressure from authori-
ties. Even the paper’s archive was deleted 
from the internet. Ironically, the general 
himself was arrested and convicted for 
money laundering. 
The bureaucrats have the support of 
many Jordanian nationalist activists, who 
mobilized protests during the last three 
years. Activists have used the bureaucrats’ 
opposition to the neoliberal camp in their 
own struggle against the monarchy. The 
bureaucrats have also used this common 
interest for their own benefit. 
The Danger of Losing the Social Base 
The old guardians, described by the king as 
“dinosaurs,” have a strong influence on the 
masses. This means that the monarchy may 
start to lose its only social base if it con-
tinues the neoliberal economic approach 
and privatization policies. These policies 
may convince Washington that King 
Abdullah is making sound decisions, but 
they have been met with anger by the 
Jordanian population. Paradoxically, the 
old guardians who used to implement 
policies aligned with Western approaches 
actually turned out to be radical opponents 
of the West. Jordanians have come to asso-
ciate economic problems with Western 
policies in the region. Since 2011 this has 
resulted in repeated demonstrations at the 
American embassy in Amman. 
Eastern Jordanians are angry with the 
authorities not only because of their failure 
to reduce high unemployment and poverty 
and narrow the huge gap between salaries 
and prices, but also because of the author-
ities’ direct involvement in corruption. The 
masses and military retirees alike have 
been angered by the sell-off of public insti-
tutions, which has been equated with cor-
ruption. One of the most important corrup-
tion scandals associated with privatization 
was the case of Waleed al-Kurdi, former 
CEO of the Jordanian Phosphate Mine Com-
pany. After siphoning off company profits 
for personal gain, he was able to flee to 
Britain, while authorities did little to en-
force an arrest warrant. Even the historic 
headquarters of the General Command of 
the Army was sold, causing outrage among 
the military retirees and activists influ-
enced by them. 
Indeed, corruption has been the main 
catalyst for protests in Jordan over the past 
three years. “Ali Baba the second,” a popu-
lar song chanted by the protesters, reflects 
their outrage. Based on the tale of Ali Baba 
and the forty thieves, the song includes 
names connected to the palace and associ-
ated with corruption cases. The source of 
the information about these cases – which 
were made public and are thus known to 
every citizen in Jordan today – was the 
bureaucrats, of course. Yet, sacrificing 
scapegoats like General al-Dhahabi and 
Shahin before the Anti-Corruption Com-
mission will not be enough to convince 
the masses that the regime is willing to 
seriously address corruption in its own 
ranks. Because of the unchecked power it 
holds, the monarchy is still held fully 
responsible for everything by the public. 
The Arab Spring in Jordan 
Socio-economic protests have a long tradi-
tion in parts of the country. For example, 
workers in the Ministry of Agriculture start-
ed a protest movement in 2006 that led to 
several labor demonstrations at the state 
companies being privatized. In 2009, the 
workers at al-Aqaba Port organized a huge 
protest, against which the security forces 
used disproportionate force. They even 
threw one worker from a moving car, and 
pursued the injured into the hospital, but 
the army, responsible for the hospital, pre-
vented the gendarmerie from entering. This 
was the first conflict between the army and 
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 the security forces in Jordan. Part of the 
middle class (which is mostly employed in 
the service sector) joined the movement in 
2010, as teachers launched a major strike 
that spread all over the country. 
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, 
new kinds of protests, more political in 
nature and focusing on constitutional re-
forms, have taken place. The activists who 
sparked the workers’ protest in 2006 called 
the first demonstration of the Arab Spring. 
It took place in Dhiban, 70 kilometers 
south of Amman, in January 2011. A week 
later the same activists called for another 
demonstration in Amman. All seven oppo-
sition parties were hesitant about partici-
pating in the demonstration, but their 
youth organizations insisted on taking part. 
The parties ultimately decided to partici-
pate, but without making an official decla-
ration, thus maintaining an ambiguous 
stance. The celebration in front of the Egyp-
tian embassy when President Hosni Mubarak 
fell from power in February 2011 proved a 
critical juncture, as new actors who were 
more radical than the political parties ap-
peared among the youth and started to 
form their own movements all over the 
country. 
Political Parties vs. New Social Movement 
Nonetheless, political parties started to 
dominate protests just a few weeks after the 
first demonstrations in 2011. Their slogans 
focused on demands for constitutional 
reforms, especially changes to the parlia-
mentary election and political party laws. 
The Supreme Coordinating Committee for 
the Opposition Parties started to organize 
Friday demonstrations in Amman. This led 
to the formation of the National Front for 
Reform, which included all opposition 
parties but was dominated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. All the parties except the 
Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party 
left the Front in late 2012 because of dis-
agreements regarding the Syrian crisis; 
while the Muslim Brotherhood supported 
the Syrian opposition, leftist and national-
ist parties supported the Assad regime. 
While the Muslim Brotherhood considers 
itself a rival to the Jordanian regime, its 
primary demand at the time was to be a 
political partner and play a central role in 
decision-making. Other parties sought to 
gain a chance to enter parliament, insisting 
on reforms to the electoral and party laws 
and exerting great efforts to prevent the 
youth from crossing “red lines”: some of the 
youth wanted to address the king directly 
in their slogans and call for the overthrow 
of the regime. 
Youth movements often went beyond the 
reform approach adopted by the political 
parties, demanding limits on the power of 
the king and a stronger fight against cor-
ruption. These movements also called for 
social justice. The influence of the Egyptian 
revolution resulted in a mobilization of 
Jordanian youth for protests and network-
building. These networks developed into 
several larger movements, such as the Free 
al-Tafayleh Neighborhood Movement, the 
Youth and Popular Movement in al-Karak, 
and the Sahaab Movement. These and other 
movements organized meetings and coordi-
nated efforts to mobilize demonstrations in 
all major Jordanian cities under the same 
slogans and often simultaneously. These 
movements also used social media to ex-
change expertise with similar movements 
in Tunisia and Egypt. 
In addition to youth movements, there 
were also numerous tribal movements, 
which represented Eastern Jordanian tribes 
all over the country. The Muslim Brother-
hood contributed to establishing such 
movements, but the most important role 
was played by military retirees. The Muslim 
Brotherhood also tried to dominate the 
new popular movements, as evidenced in 
a demonstration on 24 March 2011 in 
Amman, in which one person was killed. 
The Brotherhood succeeded in mobilizing 
and leading the new movements in that 
demonstration, which was an imitation of 
the Tahrir Square demonstrations in Egypt. 
However, the driving forces of the new 
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 movements felt that they were being used 
as tools of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
as a result started to lose allies and support 
among Eastern Jordanians. 
Political Decline and the Resurgence 
of the Social Movement 
The social movement in Jordan that had 
formed even before the Arab Spring re-
emerged visibly a few weeks after the 
November 2012 strike, the largest protest in 
the country since the onset of the Arab 
Spring. The strike, which took place all over 
the country and lasted for an entire week, 
was both political and social in nature. It 
was initially triggered by the prime minis-
ter’s announcement of price increases on 
13 November, but soon became a popular 
uprising demanding the overthrow of the 
regime. This was the first time that oppo-
sition parties, youth organizations, and 
tribal movements successfully mobilized 
almost the whole of the Jordanian elector-
ate to participate in an uprising. 
During the November strike, protests 
became more radical and a popular up-
rising became a growing possibility. Draw-
ing comparisons to the deteriorating situa-
tion in Syria, the political parties sought to 
control the situation and prevent the strike 
from turning into a revolution. Despite the 
fact that its youth organization was directly 
involved in the radical protests, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s leadership put consider-
able effort into controlling events via the 
National Front in order to avoid any un-
expected outcome of the spontaneous 
demonstrations. The Brotherhood wanted 
to send a message to the authorities and 
use the protests as a tool to apply pressure, 
but did not want the demonstrations to 
take a revolutionary turn. Members of the 
other parties in the Front sought to prevent 
people from chanting slogans calling for 
regime change. 
However, the political parties were not 
effective in controlling the situation, and 
their efforts were limited to Amman. Two 
main factors functioned to prevent escala-
tion and led to a marked decline in the pro-
tests: the situation in Syria and the meas-
ured way in which the authorities dealt 
with the demonstrations, mostly avoiding 
bloodshed (unlike in neighboring coun-
tries). After the November 2012 strike the 
political movement declined as demands 
for social security and justice replaced calls 
for political and electoral reforms. 
Yet fears about the Syrian crisis will not 
deter the masses for long. This was demon-
strated in January 2014 in Maan, where an 
innocent citizen was killed by security 
forces in a raid. Angry demonstrations took 
place in the city, state buildings were burn-
ed, gunshots were fired at police stations, 
and nine people were killed by the security 
forces. Internal Affairs Minister Hussain al-
Majali described the events as unparalleled 
in the country’s history. 
Reforms vs. Grassroots Ambitions 
In August 2012, the US embassy in Amman 
expressed its appreciation of the road map 
for reforms put forward by King Abdullah. 
The 2011 road map included the formation 
of the National Dialogue Committee as well 
as promises to amend the constitution and 
reform parliamentary election and political 
party laws. However, the promised reforms 
have only been implemented in a super-
ficial fashion. The government has been 
accused by various newspapers and politi-
cal parties of impeding the king’s reforms. 
Even if such reforms were enacted, they 
would fail to satisfy grassroots demands, as 
the people are more interested in fighting 
against corruption and enabling the state 
to own businesses and thus provide work 
opportunities. The authorities have failed 
to take any concrete steps to address the 
corruption and socioeconomic problems 
that sparked the protests in the first place. 
The National Dialogue Committee, led 
by Taher al-Masri, then Chairman of the 
Senate, included opposition parties, ex-
perts, and national figures and concentrat-
ed largely on political goals, particularly 
election and political party laws. The Euro-
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 pean Union considered the establishment 
of the National Dialogue Committee and 
the Supreme Committee for the Parlia-
mentary Elections as concrete steps toward 
democracy and reform. But the National 
Dialogue Committee was little more than 
decoration, as it had no decision-making 
powers. In addition, figures from the popu-
lar movements were notably excluded. 
The election law, furthermore, provides 
no realistic opportunity for political parties 
to be elected to parliament; citizens have 
only one vote, which, according to long-
standing social tradition, they give to their 
tribe’s representatives, rather than to a 
political party. Thus, a party-based parlia-
mentary system cannot be achieved unless 
a system of proportional representation 
that enables voters to elect tribal represent-
atives as well as political parties is intro-
duced. That is not foreseen, however. As a 
consequence, if the elected government 
promised by the king were ever to be estab-
lished, it would be based on individual 
interests rather than political programs. 
Remobilization 
Despite the king’s promises of reforms, 
economic problems have steadily worsened. 
The official unemployment rate is 11.8 per-
cent, while youth unemployment has 
soared to over 30 percent. The authorities, 
optimistic because of the apparent calm-
ness of Jordanian society, announced sever-
al price increases on basic products, most 
recently in January 2014. Consequently, 
after the decline of the political demon-
strations, strikes ignited among the work-
ing class. Strikes have also flared up since 
December 2012 in state institutions, includ-
ing the Customs Department, the Depart-
ment of Statistics, the courts, and even the 
Ministry of the Interior. Independent trade 
unions have started to mobilize. Youth 
activists have started to collaborate with 
the workers’ protests by offering logistic 
and organizational support. 
Journalists organized their own demon-
strations in 2012 against the new press 
and publication law, which had led to the 
blocking of more than 200 websites. During 
these demonstrations, journalists declared 
their solidarity with the detainees of the 
November strike, who had been arrested on 
the orders of a military court. The youth 
activists also supported these demonstra-
tions. Other protests organized by journal-
ists centered on economic demands. Jour-
nalists, public employees, military retirees, 
workers, and the youth movements all 
worked together. 
Implications of the 
Regional Situation 
While the crisis in Syria prevented the 
November 2012 strike from escalating into 
an uprising, it is also fueling the conflict 
within the Jordanian regime and threaten-
ing the country’s stability. The bureaucrats 
consider the neoliberals’ policy on Syrian 
refugees a conspiracy against Jordanian 
identity (in mid-2014 Jordan was hosting 
some 600,000 registered Syrian refugees 
plus many more unregistered) . The mili-
tary retirees criticized the government’s 
policy, describing it as a devious policy 
aiming to impoverish Jordanian citizens to 
force them to accept schemes targeting the 
country’s existence and identity. In addi-
tion, decision-makers have been charged 
with corruption in connection with aid for 
Syrian refugees. Thus, the bureaucrats have 
been cultivating a perspective among the 
Jordanian grassroots that the neoliberals 
are not only selling off their country, but 
also stealing the financial aid that comes 
from abroad. 
The danger of an escalation into a re-
gional crisis was reflected in a June 2014 
demonstration in Maan that declared soli-
darity with the Islamic State (IS). Abu Sayyaf, 
one of the jihadist leaders in Jordan, declar-
ed that the leadership is waiting for a fatwa 
on IS’s declaration of an Islamic caliphate. 
IS announced that Jordan would be a target 
for suicide attacks. Jihadists would regard 
any political destabilization of Jordan as a 
great opportunity. 




Three different scenarios seem to be plau-
sible with regard to the future of the Hash-
emite Kingdom: substantial reforms and 
national compromise; the return of the old 
guardians; and the escalation of the protest 
movement into revolution. 
Substantial Reforms, 
National Compromise 
King Abdullah has declared several times 
that he is willing to lead the country to-
wards a constitutional monarchy and a 
form of government that would give parlia-
ment real decision-making power. This 
would, however, require a strong will to 
achieve tangible reforms. Without such 
resolve, the parliamentary system will con-
tinue to be based on coalitions of individu-
als who are more interested in striking 
political deals for their own advantage than 
achieving political reform. The current 
system is also dominated by the executive 
and the intelligence agency, which restricts 
the independence of members of parlia-
ment. In Morocco, the king agreed to re-
duce his power by allowing a space in 
which political parties play a role, even if 
limited, in decision-making. King Abdullah 
may choose to undertake similar reforms in 
order to prevent the emergence of a new 
wave of radical protests. 
Sharing power and responsibility with 
other political forces may not solve socio-
economic problems, but if these reforms 
are achieved, the palace would no longer be 
in a situation of confrontation with politi-
cal forces and the masses. This would deter 
any spontaneous revolt and create a wider 
space for a real democratic system. By 
providing a chance for all social and politi-
cal forces to participate in decision-making 
commensurate to their weight in society, 
tension within the regime would be elimi-
nated, thereby ending the binary struggle 
between new liberals and old bureaucrats. 
For example, in 1989 a political opening 
successfully prevented the major April 
strike, centered on social and economic 
demands, from turning into an insurrec-
tion. Such an approach may work again, 
but more concrete steps toward a parlia-
mentary and constitutional monarchy 
would be necessary. 
Return of the Old Guardians 
The bureaucrats, or old guardians, seek to 
regain the power they had in the past, and 
thus consider the popular anger over eco-
nomic policy as a tool that might re-em-
power them. A new wave of large-scale 
protests could thus become the entry point 
through which the bureaucrats succeed in 
their attempts to dominate the regime 
again – as they would be needed to control 
the situation before it reached a critical 
point because they still control the security 
apparatus and might be able to influence 
the Eastern Jordanians. 
In such a situation, the bureaucrats 
might be able to accomplish their goal and 
win the struggle against the neoliberal 
actors within the regime. At the same time, 
a more democratic order would definitely 
not be achieved if the bureaucrats domi-
nated the decision-making process. Rather, 
they might well impose martial law (as was 
considered in 2012) as a way to consolidate 
their newly regained power and prevent 
the outbreak of a revolution.  
Escalation of Protest 
Contrary to the announcements of the 
authorities, current decisions and policies 
show that the state is moving in the oppo-
site direction from democracy-building or 
even political liberalization. Yet, the 
monarchy may not be able to control the 
situation if faced with a new wave of large-
scale protests, as the military has no inter-
est in fighting at the neoliberals’ side. 
The new driving forces of the protest 
movement, particularly the youth move-
ments and the tribal movements, are more 
radical than the political parties, and more 
likely and better able to lead a protest 
movement that would call for the over-
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 throw of the regime rather than just for 
political reform. If a full-scale revolution 
involving almost all sectors of society 
emerges, it is likely that inhabitants of 
Palestinian refugee camps would also par-
ticipate, given that the camps participated 
actively in the November strike. While 
Palestinians are unlikely to initiate any 
uprising on their own, if a wide-ranging 
insurrection is sparked by other societal 
actors, the Palestinian camps might well 
join in. 
At that point, it would be difficult for 
even the bureaucrats to guide the trajectory 
of the protests in their desired direction. 
The situation might be aggravated not only 
by regional and international interference 
but also by the repercussions of the Syrian 
crisis, in particular radical Salafist jihadist 
organizations fighting there but based in 
Jordan. Such a scenario might seriously 
threaten the survival of the monarchy and 
even the state. 
Alternatively, a national front might be 
formed that unites social and political 
forces to confront radical Islamist organiza-
tions and fight for popular demands at the 
same time. This front would embrace activ-
ists who already have deep contacts with 
the grassroots and notable experience in 
mobilizing people and coordinating with 
different societal forces. 
Conclusion and 
Policy Recommendations 
In the end, maintaining the current politi-
cal order will threaten the stability of 
Jordan, while sharing responsibilities and 
limiting the power of the king would 
enable Jordan to be more resilient in the 
face of escalating protests and an increas-
ingly turbulent region. To achieve this, 
concrete steps toward democracy should be 
taken. First, the challenge of corruption 
needs to be addressed. The regime should 
move beyond prosecuting isolated cases 
and demonstrate a strong willingness to 
fight systemic corruption. One step in this 
direction would be to empower the Anti-
Corruption Commission and make it an 
effective oversight body, monitoring all 
state institutions. 
Second, a genuine national dialogue in 
which all social and political actors parti-
cipate should be conducted to discuss 
political and economic priorities and con-
stitutional reforms. The decisions of such a 
conference or series of conferences should 
be taken seriously to avoid the palace being 
seen as opposed to the popular will. Even 
if economic problems persist, it would be 
easier for people to accept them if they see 
them as a result of their own decisions. 
Third, the abolition of military courts 
and the expansion of civil liberties would 
be important signals to activists and the 
public alike that there is a real will for 
reform of the system. 
Fourth, the government should avoid 
involvement in wider regional crises. 
Fifth, the issue of social justice needs to 
be taken seriously. The widening gap be-
tween prices and salaries, as well as the 
privatization of state companies, education, 
and health services, have created apprehen-
sion within society, and the lack of public 
transportation makes the situation even 
worse. These problems have always been 
the primary concerns of the grassroots. 
As a consequence, European countries 
should not only maintain pressure on 
Jordan for genuine political reform but also 
focus on supporting concrete, productive 
projects to mitigate problems of unemploy-
ment and poverty. In this, it is important 
that the state is seen as playing an active 
and positive role in fighting corruption, 
generating employment, and running pro-
ductive projects. 
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